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Against Intellectual Monopoly, by Michele Boldrin and David Levine (2007), is a
coherent, well-written, and persuasive argument against strong forms of government
protection of intellectual property rights. The authors contend that intellectual
property rights do not generally promote social welfare, that intellectual property
protection generates perverse distributional outcomes, and that firms do not respond
to greater levels of protection of intellectual property protection by actually
producing more innovation or, if they do, such additional creation is not socially
optimal. Although generally quite sound, the book is not without problems; its
normative judgments of drug companies are wildly overstated, and the first-mover
argument does not adequately address the virtually instantaneous availability of
many copyrighted goods online. The book is not written from an Austrian
perspective per se, but does extend the logic of the benefits of competitive markets
to non-physical goods, and draws conclusions that libertarians are likely to welcome.
The authors hold that major technological progress occurs more or less spontane-
ously as a result of individuals making incremental changes to improve products and
processes, and that the financial incentives generated by intellectual property monopoly
do not significantly fuel innovation. The authors persuasively argued this point in many
parts of the book, and provide dozens of strong supporting examples of how intellectual
monopoly probably slows technological change. They also provide examples of markets
that flourished because of an absence of strong intellectual property rights: Hollywood
emerged as the global leader in film production because it was too remote for
Washington to enforce Edison’s patents there, the German chemical engineering
political action group’s campaign against domestic patenting laws while actively
encouraging patent laws in rival countries, the fast-paced and generally highly
responsive fashion markets, the growth of Silicon Valley as the hub of IT innovation
instead of Route 128 because California would not enforce non-compete labor
agreements, etc. The sheer number of anecdotes presented in support of their
argument—industries harmed by strong intellectual property, industries which
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flourished because of the creative destruction promoted by the competitive environ-
ments associated with zero intellectual property—is persuasive.
Boldrin and Levine (2007) hold a lot of creative work inspired by self-
actualization and first-mover advantages. They challenge the notion of the individual
creator working for all hours of the night to solve a big problem with financial
incentives at the forefront of his or her mind. The authors hold that first-mover
advantages in materials that are today copyrighted are sufficient financial motivation
for the production of creative works. They support this view with many persuasive
anecdotes from film, books, and music.
The authors do not think the ending of copyright will lead to a significant decline
in production of creative works. Although the monopoly gains from copyright will
be smaller, the scale of the market is also likely to grow larger as IP laws are relaxed,
which in aggregate has an ambiguous impact. This is obviously a subjective
assertion based almost entirely on rationale and not on evidence, and it is uncertain
how one could really establish this point in the face of a cogent counter-claim.
The empirical evidence presented byBoldrin and Levine (2007) is also persuasive. If
starting from a position of moderate levels of intellectual property protection,
generating stronger intellectual property rights does not generate greater levels of
creative work, substantive research, or economic growth. The only thing that stronger
patent laws have been shown to generate is more patents and more lawsuits.
The authors repeatedly argue that first-mover advantages allow companies to take
advantage of economies of scale in manufacturing, and that impatience effects will
generate brief monopoly profits early after the release of goods that are currently
protected by copyright. This argument has conceptual problems.
While this is probably true of patents—they largely establish that this advantage is
present in physical goods with logic and an overwhelming number of anecdotes—this
does not likely hold for nonphysical goods capable of being shared over peer to peer
networks. Pirated versions of video games, movies, and music are often available on the
day of release1 on popular torrent websites, and the only difference between the
illegally downloaded versions of games and music is that end-users do not receive the
physical DVD, CD, or packaging associated with purchased goods. This largely
eliminates first mover and impatience effects that the authors suggest would be
financial incentive enough to incentivize production of movies, books, and games.
The authors could have strengthened their zero-copyright argument with a
separate assertion. Several companies have pursued successful strategies in de facto
intellectual property vacuums. Microsoft often ignores end-user piracy to gain
market share, Blizzard creates products that are difficult to pirate and provides
compelling product updates, the Grateful Dead employed an eclectic approach to IP
enforcement, and South Park provides its goods at zero monetary cost and streams
advertisements. And most DVD and CD companies are differentiating their products
with special editions, unique art, and accessory goods.2 Companies can find ways to
generate revenue from their ideas in the absence of intellectual property protection,
they just have to continually innovate and adapt to often fickle consumer preference
in order to do so. That many firms would prefer not to do so is unsurprising.
1 As of the date of this writing, PirateBay is currently hosting Iron Man 2 prior to its release in theaters.
2 See collectors editions of Terminator 2, Metallica’s Greatest Hits, or Lord of the Rings
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Some of Boldrin and Levine’s (2007) normative conclusions are plainly not
supported. The authors literally compare the CEOs of drug companies to Hitler and
Stalin for failing to provide their goods at zero profit to individuals in Africa.
Restraining the production of drugs that lengthen the lives of people with HIV and
AIDS in order to earn economic rents is clearly not an act of altruism, but nor is it
the moral equivalent of mass political killings. That one is not Oscar Schindler does
not mean one is Adolf Hitler.
Measurement problems abound in attempting to quantify the relationship between
macrotechnology and intellectual protection, so the empirical research is somewhat
limited. Outside research largely confirmed the arguments presented by Boldrin and
Levine (2007). The Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, which basically eliminated
all intellectual property in the US previously held by Germans or German companies,
clearly increased innovation (Moser and Voena 2009). The FTC and DOJ effort to
weaken patents in telephone and copy machinery also clearly had a positive impact on
innovation (Breshanan 1985). Further research in this area is clearly needed; however,
the research that has taken place in this field largely confirms the authors’ arguments.
Work in social psychology—admittedly trending more towards scientific
innovation and artistic creativity than entrepreneurial activity—on this issue almost
completely ignores profits. Views of innovation and creativity in the field3
emphasize random elements, self-actualization, theories progressively building on
one another, of the lone exceptionally high-IQ genius, of zeitgeist, of other minority
views, and syntheses of these views. Monopoly profits—and economic incentives
generally—are not seen as the dominant force in innovation. This literature has
neglected entrepreneurs to a certain extent, but it seems unlikely that we will miss
the next Newton or Vivaldi because of insufficient intellectual property rights.
Reviewing the literature in social psychology and economics, innovation appears
to be a function of chance, self-actualization, spontaneous discovery, a zeitgeist
which fosters robust competition, profits, and informal social payoffs. The
importance of each factor probably varies by discipline—profits are likely a greater
motivator in the creation of new prescription drugs and commercial art than in poetry
or social science. Boldrine and Levine (2007) integrate the complexity of likely
determinants of innovation into their argument, while supporters of strong forms of
intellectual property rights have often wildly overstated the importance of profits.
The limited empirical evidence, and the strongest arguments presented by the
authors, suggests that a limited degree of intellectual property protection would be the
most efficient. The first mover argument falls apart for many copyrighted goods, the
authors have no fully established the negative long run economic consequences of
limited-term patent protection of prescription drugs, but the rest of their arguments are
very sound and the empirical evidence generally supports their positions.
The authors admit that some intellectual property likely promotes welfare-
enhancing innovation, but assert that any degree of intellectual property protection
will trigger rent seeking, and that this rent seeking will generate public choice
problems that will ultimately lead to a strong-form IP state. This assertion is not
without at least a degree of merit.4 In the end, it appears that the choice between a
3 One summary of this research is Greatness: Who Makes History and Why by Dean Simonton (1994).
4 See the petition by certain vested interests in the fashion industry to make fashion design subject to
intellectual property: http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat072706.html
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low level of intellectual property protection and no intellectual property protection is
whether one considers the welfare-enhancing effect of some intellectual property
protection greater than the public choice risks. Whether public choice problems are
tendency or destiny is far too broad a question for this paper. Although imperfect,
Against Intellectual Monopoly is a fascinating and provocative read.
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